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Willard: Decoding Student Speech Rights

COMMENT
DECODING STUDENT SPEECH
RIGHTS: CLARIFICATION AND
APPLICATION OF SUPREME COURT
PRINCIPLES TO ONLINE STUDENT
SPEECH CASES

COURTNEY M. WILLARD* **
INTRODUCTION
Imagine, as an adolescent, having the opportunity to broadcast
every mindless or offensive thought that blew through your brain to a
vast audience of your peers and complete strangers. Would you have
used discretion?
MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, 1 and
independent blogs have made it possible for adolescents to have a
widespread audience for their unfiltered speech. 2 The accessibility of the

* Editor’s Note: Last year, the Golden Gate community was deeply saddened by
Courtney’s unexpected and untimely death. It is my humble privilege to publish her work here,
posthumously. This piece is presented largely in its original form, having been minimally edited.
We owe our deepest gratitude to Courtney’s mother, Aundrea Turner, and her father, Jonathan
Willard, for extending us the opportunity to publish this piece in Courtney’s memory. We are evergrateful for Professor Eric Christiansen’s support and guidance on this Comment. Additionally, I
must thank the Law Review Editorial Board, particularly Kyle Mabe and Jessica Rosen, for their
unwavering dedication to this process.
** Courtney M. Willard, Nov. 4, 1987–Apr. 18, 2012. Certificate of Attendance, Golden
Gate University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Political Science, Michigan State University, 2009.
1
See www.myspace.com; www.facebook.com; www.twitter.com; tumblr.com.
2
See, Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict
Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1235 (2003) (arguing that the
Internet is not only “ever-present but one can also quickly and easily disseminate its content to an
infinite number of people”).
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Internet has grown exponentially, even within the last decade, creating an
ever-increasing platform for speech. 3
The most likely topics of angst among students relate to their
school: teachers, friends, and extracurricular activities. Students flock to
various social media websites to share their feelings about, among other
things, these familiar topics. 4 Instantly, their thoughts are transmitted to
their peers and whoever else may have access to the content. The
opportunity to unleash personal sentiments into the blogosphere has
undoubtedly helped multitudes of young people feel connected to their
peers in unprecedented ways. It is the content of this unbridled speech,
however, that has many troubled—especially school officials. 5 It has
also given rise to several significant legal issues.
When may a school restrict student speech? What are the
constitutional boundaries of a school’s authority over student speech?
When a student chooses the Internet as a sounding board for his
offensive and possibly vulgar opinions of a teacher or fellow student,
should the school have the authority to discipline the speech? If so, what
types of school-targeted speech would warrant such disciplinary action?
The balance between a student’s First Amendment right to freedom
of expression and a school’s responsibility to provide a safe environment
for both students and staff has proved to be a difficult one to maintain. 6
The United States Supreme Court first set a standard to analyze the
constitutional limits of student speech in the 1960s with the landmark
decision of Tinker v. Des Moines School District. 7 Since then, the
evolving modes of student speech have forced the Supreme Court to
repeatedly reconsider the issue. 8 The result has been a myriad of

3

Erin Reeves, Note, The “Scope of a Student”: How To Analyze Student Speech in the Age
of the Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (2008) (“Since its modest beginnings, the Internet has
become an enormous presence in everyday life, with North America alone experiencing a usage
growth of 120% just in the years 2000-2007.”).
4
Pew Research Ctr., Trend Data (Teens), PEW INTERNET, www.pewinternet.org/StaticPages/Trend-Data-(Teens)/Online-Activites-Total.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2013) (As of July 2011,
80% of teen Internet users use an online social networking site like MySpace and Facebook).
5
See Reeves, supra note 3, at 1129 (“One area where Internet usage has been especially
contentious is in the educational realm as administrators, teachers, students, and increasingly courts
are attempting to determine how student activity on the Internet fits within current precedent
regarding appropriate behavior of students, both on- and off-campus.”).
6
See id. at 1141-42 (“[D]ue to both the evolution of technology and students’ willingness to
test the boundaries of their First Amendment rights in schools, this precedent has proven to be
murky, not easily applicable to the variety of cases that have arisen, and potentially outdated and
wholly inadequate to address the new student speech issues facing courts today.”).
7
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8
See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/5

2

Willard: Decoding Student Speech Rights

2013]

Decoding Student Speech Rights

295

decisions that chip away at the Tinker decision by creating narrow
exceptions for certain circumstances of student speech. 9
Instead of students peacefully donning black armbands in protest of
the Vietnam War, 10 modern courts are faced with increasingly offensive
student speech in the unrestricted realm of the Internet. Supreme Court
decisions have not established a sufficient method for lower courts to
uniformly analyze the modern limits of Internet student speech. 11
Without a clear standard, lower courts are obligated to force the facts of
modern cases into narrowly defined exceptions, or otherwise simply
assume the Tinker standard applies to situations previously unforeseen
by the earlier Court. Uncertainty has caused courts to flounder and hand
down conflicting decisions supported by incomplete precedent. 12
This Comment identifies the underlying principles of Supreme
Court precedent governing student speech rights and applies those
principles, as appropriate, to analyze online student speech. Part I
provides a background of the four Supreme Court cases governing
student speech. Four factors are identified from the Supreme Court
decisions that continue to guide the analysis of student speech rights:
sponsorship, location, effect, and content. Part II explores lower courts’
confusion in applying the four factors to online student speech cases.
Finally, Part III examines the factors applicable to online student
speech and provides guidance for future courts to analyze online student
speech rights. As the predominant Supreme Court precedent, the Tinker
standard should be used to analyze online student speech cases because it
correctly addresses the effect of a student’s speech felt within the school.
Further, three categories are presented that should guide courts’
assessment of the content of online student speech: outrageous or
inherently offensive speech; speech that is focused or targeted toward the
9

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (holding that a student’s free speech rights were not violated based
on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
273 (holding that school officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a
high school newspaper published by students in class); Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (holding that school
officials may “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as
promoting illegal drug use”).
10
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
11
Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the First
Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into CyberSpace,
24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731, 746 (2010) (“Courts have applied the Tinker, Fraser,
Kuhlmeier and, now, Morse standards in varying ways to decide Internet student speech cases.
Moreover, some courts have found that school officials lack disciplinary authority over student
Internet expression altogether because of the expression’s off-campus nature.” (footnote omitted)).
12
Stephanie Klupinski, Note, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech
in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 625 (2010) (“With no clear understanding of when and how
to evaluate Internet speech, the courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of standards
and tests to the cases before them.”).
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school, students, or faculty; and general school-related speech. Lower
courts need a standard to analyze student speech, but until the Supreme
Court specifically rules on online student speech, the principles set forth
in previous rulings must be consistently applied.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS
Since the Supreme Court first ruled on students’ free speech rights
Each
in 1969, the Court has revisited the area three times. 13
supplementary decision carved out an exception 14 to the original rule
allowing restriction of student expression when the speech created a
“material and substantial disruption” to the school. 15 The four Supreme
Court decisions identified four general factors that govern student speech
rights: a school’s possible sponsorship of the speech, the location of the
student’s speech, the effect of the speech felt within the school, and the
content of the speech. 16 Lower courts, having no other guidance, have
inconsistently applied these factors to online student speech cases
resulting in a “state of tumult about the precise scope of First
Amendment rights possessed by students.” 17
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT OF STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS
1. The Two-Prong Tinker Standard
Set against the backdrop of civil unrest during the 1960s, it was the
decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District that
declared, “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed

13

See generally Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260; Morse, 551 U.S. at

393.
14

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (holding that a student’s free speech rights were not violated based
on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
273 (holding that school officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a
high school newspaper published by students in class); Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (holding that school
officials may “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as
promoting illegal drug use”).
15
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
16
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (holding that a student’s free speech rights were not violated based
on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
273 (holding that school officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a
high school newspaper published by students in class); Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (holding that school
officials may “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as
promoting illegal drug use”).
17
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free
Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1139 (2003).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/5

4

Willard: Decoding Student Speech Rights

2013]

Decoding Student Speech Rights

297

their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.” 18 A group of adults and students within one school
district chose to object to the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands
to their respective schools. 19 As an attempt to preempt the political
protest, the principals of the school district adopted a policy to punish
any student who refused to remove his armband and suspend the student
until he returned without the armband. 20 Three Tinker siblings were
suspended when they chose to wear the armbands, and subsequently filed
suit challenging the school’s right to punish them for exercising their
First Amendment right to free speech. 21
The Court addressed the tension created when students’ First
Amendment free speech rights intersect with the duties and rules of
school authorities. 22 Extracting language from the Fifth Circuit, the
Court focused on whether the armbands “‘materially and substantially
interfer[ed] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school’ [or] collid[ed] with the rights of others.” 23 The
facts showed that the armbands did provoke some hostile remarks and a
dispute during class involving a protestor. 24 However, finding “no
indication that the work of the schools or any class was disrupted,” the
majority found the school’s disciplinary actions violated the students’
First Amendment rights. 25
Rejecting the lower court’s ruling that the suspensions were based
on a reasonable fear of disturbance, the Supreme Court confirmed the
principle that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” will
not overcome students’ First Amendment right to freedom of
expression. 26 The standard of material and substantial interference
works to ensure school officials will not act under a “mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.” 27 The Tinker students were suspended because of
a motivation to avoid the potential controversy regarding the Vietnam
War protest, not disruption within the school. 28

18

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 504.
20
Id.
21
Id.; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.
Iowa 1966), aff’d, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
22
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
23
Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
24
Id. at 517.
25
Id. at 508.
26
Id. at 509; see also Tinker, 258 F. Supp. 971.
27
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
28
Id. at 510.
19
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The Court also refused to restrict freedom of expression to
classroom hours. 29 A student—in or out of class—whose actions
produce a material disruption in classwork, create substantial disorder, or
invade the rights of others, will not be protected from punishment. 30
This standard has created a variety of conflicting decisions in the lower
courts when attempting to apply the Tinker standard to online student
speech cases. 31
2. Lewd and Obscene Student Speech
Recognizing a need to address specific types of student speech,
Bethel School District v. Fraser created a standard to apply to a student’s
use of lewd and obscene speech while on school campus. 32 During a
mandatory high school assembly, Matthew Fraser delivered a speech
containing an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor” to the
response of hooting, yelling, and sexually graphic gestures. 33 School
officials suspended Fraser, referencing the Tinker standard and
pronouncing his speech as “indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty
and decency” of the audience. 34
The Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent a school
district from disciplining Fraser, but rather that the suspension was
“perfectly appropriate,” 35 given that the conduct was “wholly
inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.” 36
It is this standard, not Tinker’s “material and substantial interference”
language, that the Court employed in deciding school officials did not
violate Fraser’s First Amendment rights. 37 The only Tinker analysis
comes as a brief investigation on the possible embarrassment to teenaged
school students, and the otherwise immature audience of 14-year-old
teenagers. 38
Confusing the newly founded standard, the Court alluded to other
factors supporting its decision. The Court distinguished Fraser from

29

Id. at 512.
Id. at 513.
31
See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625 (“With no clear understanding of when and how to
evaluate Internet speech, the [lower] courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of
standards and tests to the cases before them.”).
32
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680, 684-86 (1986).
33
Id. at 678-79.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 685.
36
Id. at 685-86.
37
Id. at 685.
38
Id. at 683-84.
30
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Tinker, indicating the important difference between the political speech
of the armbands and the sexual content of Fraser’s speech. 39 Unlike the
penalties enforced against a political viewpoint, sanctions based on lewd
and indecent speech were “entirely within [the school’s] permissible
authority.” 40 In addition, consideration was given to the young age and
captive nature of the audience. 41 The Court failed to make clear which
factor, or mixture of factors, was the most significant. 42
3. School-Sponsored Student Speech
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, faced with student
speech that was neither lewd nor offensive, and not actually uttered on
school grounds, the Supreme Court imposed yet another standard to
analyze the First Amendment challenge. 43 There, a principal eliminated
two pages of the school newspaper to remove articles concerning teen
pregnancy and the impact of divorce on students. 44 Giving weight to the
school’s curriculum guidelines, the Court found no First Amendment
violation because the school newspaper was not an entirely public forum
for student speech. 45
Because Tinker merely answered the question of whether schools
were required to tolerate particular student speech, the Hazelwood Court
Instead, it decided an
refused to apply the Tinker standard. 46
independent standard may be necessary to “determin[e] when a school
may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student
expression.” 47 Accordingly, no school offends the First Amendment
when it restricts student speech “in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as [the administration’s] actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 48
The Hazelwood dissent immediately questioned the departure from
Tinker. 49 It indicated that while the decision did not cast doubt on the
viability of the long-standing precedent, it worked to create a “taxonomy
39

Id. at 680.
Id. at 685.
41
Id. at 684.
42
Klupinski, supra note 12, at 615.
43
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that school
officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a high school newspaper
published by students in class).
44
Id. at 263-65.
45
Id. at 270.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 272-73.
48
Id. at 273.
49
Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40
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of school censorship” where Tinker may “appl[y] to one category [of
student speech] and not another.” 50
Consequently, this decision
contributes to the confusion concerning the reach of Tinker as it applies
to certain situations of student speech. 51
4. Student Speech Promoting Illegal Drug Use
A banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” was at the center of the
Supreme Court’s latest decision to examine students’ rights under the
First Amendment. 52 In Morse v. Frederick, a student unfurled the banner
on broadcast television while at an arguably school-sponsored social
School officials
event celebrating the Olympic Torch Relay. 53
suspended him for encouraging illegal drug use. 54 In finding that the
speech was both on-campus and non-political speech, the Court found no
violation of the student’s First Amendment rights. 55
Struggling to apply precedent to this case, the Supreme Court found
it necessary to create a distinct standard pertaining to student speech
promoting illegal drug use. The Court decided it was not obligated to
apply Tinker, because Fraser and Hazelwood both established and
confirmed the reality that Tinker did not produce an immutable analysis
for student speech rights. 56 Instead, the Court ruled that school officials
may, without violating a student’s First Amendment rights, restrict
student speech at a school event “when that speech is reasonably viewed
as promoting illegal drug use.” 57
From these four Supreme Court decisions, there are numerous
circumstances under which school officials can discipline students for
speech. The primary grounds for a school’s restriction of student speech
turns on whether the student’s speech caused or could reasonably cause a
material or substantial disruption, or collide with the rights of others as
explained in Tinker. 58 Fraser allows punishment for a student’s lewd or

50

Id. at 281.
Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 746 (“Courts have applied the Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier
and, now, Morse standards in varying ways to decide Internet student speech cases. Moreover, some
courts have found that school officials lack disciplinary authority over student Internet expression
altogether because of the expression’s off-campus nature.” (footnote omitted)).
52
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
53
Id. at 397-98.
54
Id. at 398.
55
Id. at 401-03.
56
Id. at 405-06.
57
Id. at 403.
58
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding that
student’s free speech rights are violated when restricted unless the effect of the speech was a
51

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/5

8

Willard: Decoding Student Speech Rights

2013]

Decoding Student Speech Rights

301

obscene speech. 59 Hazelwood allows a school’s restriction of speech that
may be interpreted to represent the school. 60 Finally, Morse allows the
restriction of student speech that promotes illegal drug use. 61
B. ANALYZING ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH: SPONSORSHIP, LOCATION,
EFFECT, AND CONTENT
1. Lessons Learned from Supreme Court Precedent
Four main factors can be identified as guiding the Supreme Court’s
analysis of student free speech: sponsorship, location, effect, and
content. 62 Tinker provides the foundation for analyzing student speech
based on its location, effect, and content. 63 Tinker noted that within the
boundary of the schoolhouse gate was an appropriate location for school
officials to exert their authority over student speech. 64 The effect of the
black armbands was the pivotal focus of the decision, which held that, to
merit restriction by school authorities, speech must cause or be
reasonably likely to cause a “material[] and substantial[] disruption” or
“collid[e] with the rights of others.” 65 Finally, the Tinker Court
considered the content of the speech, finding that the political nature of
the speech deserved strong protection. 66
The content and location of the sexually explicit speech during a
school assembly were the driving force in Fraser. 67 Likewise, the latest
Supreme Court decision, Morse, focused on the location and content of
the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner during a school event to restrict
student speech that promotes illegal drug use. 68 Hazelwood authorizes a

material or substantial interference with the discipline of the school or the speech invades the rights
of another student).
59
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986) (holding that a student’s free
speech rights were not violated based on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school
assembly).
60
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that school
officials could reserve the right to reasonably restrict certain portions of a high school newspaper
published by students in class).
61
Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (holding that school officials may “restrict student speech at a
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”).
62
Klupinski, supra note 12, at 643.
63
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
64
Id. at 506.
65
Id. at 513.
66
Id. at 510-11.
67
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678-81 (1986).
68
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007).
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school’s ability to restrict some student speech when the speech could be
considered school-sponsored. 69
2. The Absence of a Supreme Court Ruling on Online Student Speech
Has Left Lower Courts in Chaos
The divergent nature of free speech cases, coupled with the “special
characteristics of the school environment,” 70 may render one uniform
rule inadequate to govern student speech cases. 71 However, the current
array of Supreme Court precedent provides little to no guidance as
applied to online student speech cases. 72
It is unsurprising that lower courts have struggled in piecing
together a coherent and consistent standard under which to analyze
online student speech. 73 The Internet is a “unique medium” 74 that
disseminates speech anywhere there is a connection to the web. 75 To the
detriment of the proper adjudication of such a complex First Amendment
issue, lower courts are currently left to decide cases with precedent that
cannot easily be applied to online student speech. 76
When the Court last addressed student speech rights in 2007, it
missed an important chance to more carefully define the parameters of
student speech that occurs outside of the traditional “schoolhouse
gate.” 77 Online student speech cases present a unique situation for
schools, because otherwise applicable Supreme Court decisions limit
school officials’ authority to regulate student speech that occurs within

69

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
71
See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685 (creating special exception to First Amendment protections
allowing schools to punish lewd and obscene student speech at school functions); Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 271 (creating special exception to First Amendment protections allowing schools to regulate
school-sponsored newspaper speech); Morse, 551 U.S. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining
“the Court creates another exception” to Tinker).
72
Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 753 (“As their decisions clearly demonstrate, lower courts
are left to their own devices in determining the proper bounds of school authority over student
Internet speech.” (footnote omitted)).
73
See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625 (“With no clear understanding of when and how to
evaluate Internet speech, the courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of standards
and tests to the cases before them.”).
74
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
75
Servance, supra note 2, at 1237.
76
See, Louis John Seminski, Jr., Note, Tinkering with Student Free Speech: the Internet and
the Need for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 176 (2001) (arguing that “in light of the ‘fuzzy’
precedents and their application to the Internet, many school boards settle the cases before trial in
attempts to save on legal fees and taxpayer dollars”).
77
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
70
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Tinker’s “schoolhouse gate.” 78 By focusing on the illegal drug use, the
Morse Court also failed to provide a clear analysis for situations where
the Tinker standard is inapplicable because the facts fall outside of the
Court’s narrow exceptions. 79
Despite lower courts’ calls for guidance and a need for an
articulated standard, the Court has not shown any urgency in resolving
the matter in the near future. Recently, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on three online student speech cases. 80 At least two of the
cases seem to be at odds: one case authorizes the punishment of a student
for her online attacks against a fellow student, 81 while the other finds the
punishment of a student for his online attacks against his teacher a
violation of his free speech rights. 82 Lower courts must have guidance
from the Court to prevent this type of flagrantly inconsistent application
of First Amendment speech protection.
II. LOWER COURTS’ ANALYSIS OF ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH
Though lower courts have properly identified the important factors
influencing student speech rights cases—sponsorship, location, effect,
and content—confusion is evident in the application of these factors.
Extending precedent to online student speech cases has resulted in
haphazard decisions with judges admittedly unsure of which standard to
apply. 83 A narrow reading of the Supreme Court’s four factors has
hindered the lower courts’ ability to apply the principles to online student
speech cases.
A. SPONSORSHIP
The precedent of Hazelwood is directly applicable to schoolsponsored online student speech, and generally uncontested in student
speech cases. 84 Under Hazelwood, school officials have authority to
restrict student speech that may reasonably be interpreted as being

78

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
Reeves, supra note 3, at 1147.
80
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (cases below, 650 F.3d 915 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc));
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (case below, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011)).
81
See generally Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
82
See generally J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
83
Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625 (“With no clear understanding of when and how to
evaluate Internet speech, the courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of standards
and tests to the cases before them.”).
84
See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
79
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Any legitimate pedagogical purpose will be
school-sponsored. 85
sufficient to restrict this type of student speech given the school’s
continued interest in deciding when it chooses to “lend its name and
resources to the dissemination of student expression.” 86 A student’s
online speech that is reasonably interpreted to be school-sponsored, bears
the school’s name, or was created or disseminated using the school’s
resources should be bound by this precedent. 87 There is no difference
between a school newspaper and a school blog when determining
whether a student should be bound to the school’s authority.
B. LOCATION
The Court famously noted in Tinker, “It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 88 Tinker allowed the
regulation of certain student speech within the boundaries of the
“schoolhouse gate.” 89 The Internet, however, is a “unique medium” 90
that allows speech created and communicated within the comfort of a
student’s home to infiltrate the schoolhouse gate. 91
The location of the student’s online speech—a distinction between
on-campus and off-campus speech—has proved to be a critical factor for
courts in determining the constitutionality of online student speech
regulation. 92 Acknowledging the importance of the distinction between
on-campus and off-campus speech, but not knowing the appropriate
ways in which to classify them, 93 courts are at a disadvantage from the
beginning.
The distinction between on-campus speech and off-campus speech
is considered of utmost importance, because it is commonly held that
schools have much less, if any, authority to discipline students for their

85

Id. at 272-73.
Id.
87
See id. at 273.
88
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
89
Id.
90
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
91
Servance, supra note 2, at 1235-36.
92
See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 643 (explaining how location was a critical factor, with
“all of the courts but one examined whether the speech did or could have reasonably reached the
physical school campus”).
93
Reeves, supra note 3, at 1141 (“The facts presented in Morse arguably did not point as
clearly to an on-campus determination, and while the Court provided some relevant factors to use
when the on- versus off-campus distinction is not clear, it failed to give any discernible guidance or a
stand-alone test for students, administrators, and courts to follow.” (footnote omitted)).
86
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off-campus online speech. 94 One justification for this distinction is that
off-campus speech is less likely than on-campus speech to disrupt the
school environment. 95 This justification, however, focuses on the
potential location of the speech’s effect within the school rather than the
location of the speech’s creation or reception. 96 Another justification for
the on-campus and off-campus distinction calls into question the ability
of school authorities to arbitrarily reach into students’ homes to promote
their own agenda. 97
In attempting to apply the current Supreme Court precedent to the
unique challenges presented by speech that begins within a student’s
home, lower courts have been inconsistent at best. 98 The very
classification of on-campus and off-campus speech can be manipulated
depending on whether a certain jurisdiction holds a narrow or expansive
definition. 99 While a narrow definition may deprive school authorities of
disciplinary actions for online student speech, an expansive definition
may subject students to an overbroad regulation of online expression. 100
Lower courts’ attempts to manipulate facts in order to fit an already
haphazard classification often result in further inconsistencies. 101
Particularly, dependence on a nexus between the speech and the school
has thus far resulted in a tenuous geographic analysis. 102 According to
some courts, any geographical nexus, no matter how thin, may warrant
Reliance on a
school authority over online student speech. 103
determination of the location of online student speech leads to decisions
94

See Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 758.
Sandy S. Li, Note, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued Threat to
Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 92 (2005).
96
Id.
97
See Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 758.
98
See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625 (“With no clear understanding of when and how to
evaluate Internet speech, the courts, as a result, have used an inconsistent application of standards
and tests to the cases before them.”).
99
Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 757.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 754.
102
Klupinski, supra note 12, at 627 (“The geographical approach is arguably the easiest one
courts can employ to determine whether Internet speech created off school campus can be subject to
school discipline. This approach looks at whether a sufficient nexus exists between the speech and
the school simply by determining whether the speech was physically created or ever accessed on
school grounds.”).
103
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(leaving the question of whether a student’s online speech, which was accessed on campus without
his permission, could subject him to discipline by the school); see also Kara D. Williams, Comment,
Public Schools vs. MySpace and Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U.
CIN. L. REV. 707, 720 (2008) (“First, courts have interpreted differently the distinction between oncampus and off-campus speech, with some courts defining on-campus speech much more
expansively than other courts.”).
95
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that turn on an insubstantial detail, which results in an unclear
understanding of students’ First Amendment speech rights.
As a “borderless, ubiquitous medium,” 104 the Internet has the
potential to invade the school environment, despite the fact that the
actual expression almost always occurs physically outside school
property. 105 The Internet is simply different than other, more traditional,
means of communication. 106 Specifically, it is pervasive, it allows users
to disseminate information to millions of people immediately and easily,
and it can be accessed anywhere. 107 The growing accessibility of the
Internet through mobile phones, personal laptops, and computer tablets
further expands the problem of relying on location. Any online speech
may be retrieved on school campus during school hours by the “click of
a mouse.” 108
The distinction between on-campus and off-campus speech is
antiquated and inapplicable to online student speech cases. 109 The
physical location of the speech is irrelevant given the ability of the
Internet to trespass upon the school environment. 110 Rather than labeling
online speech as “on-campus” or “off-campus,” the unique nature of the
Internet should be embraced and online speech should be examined as a
unique classification. 111
C. EFFECT
The original student speech case, Tinker, was decided with a focus
on the effect of the student’s speech. 112 A student whose speech had the
104

Servance, supra note 2, at 1237.
Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 757 (“As a practical matter, the expression at issue in
Internet-related student speech cases almost always occurs ‘off-campus.’”).
106
Servance, supra note 2, at 1235 (“Not only is Internet speech ever-present but one can also
quickly and easily disseminate its content to an infinite number of people.”).
107
Li, supra note 95, at 93 (“The Internet differs from other traditional mediums of
expression, such as flyers, newspapers, and public speeches, for several reasons: (1) it is pervasive,
(2) it allows users to disseminate information to millions of people immediately and easily, and (3) it
can be accessed anywhere.”).
108
Reeves, supra note 3, at 1149.
109
Servance, supra note 2, at 1235 (“Given this inherently different mode of expression, the
old distinctions physically demarcating authority over student speech to on or off campus are not
adequate, especially as applied to children in a school setting.”).
110
See id. at 1237.
111
Li, supra note 95, at 93 (arguing for a separate standard for online speech: “Because the
Internet is a unique medium that allows people to anonymously express their views, thereby
encouraging free speech and ideas, a separate standard is needed to ensure that . . . the anonymous
expression of students’ views over the Internet will be protected.” (footnote omitted)).
112
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (focusing on
the effect of the student’s speech—a “substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others”—as the
basis for school authorities’ ability to restrict student speech).
105
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effect of “material[] and substantial[] interfer[ence] . . . in the operation
of the school” or has “collid[ed] with the rights of others” may suffer
appropriate discipline at the hands of school officials. 113 The Internet
has exacerbated the already complex nature of student speech. 114 Online
student speech may begin in a student’s home, but it has a unique ability
to carry on and have an effect on the school. 115
Lower courts consistently analyze online student speech cases under
the Tinker standard, but rarely rely on it as a sole justification for the
proscription of online student speech. 116 Though the basis of the
decision in Tinker was the effect of the students’ speech, the famous
boundary of the schoolhouse gate causes hesitation among judges to
extend the boundary to speech that is created outside of the school but
nevertheless permeates the school environment. 117 After performing a
full Tinker analysis, courts abandon the Tinker focus on the effect felt
within the school. 118
The effect of a student’s speech has long been an important factor in
assessing student speech rights, and should continue to govern online
student speech. This fundamental factor in assessing a student’s rights
should not be abandoned just because the speech is expressed through an
ever-present means of communication. If a student’s online speech
causes, or could foreseeably cause, a substantial disruption within the
school, school officials should maintain their interest in providing a safe
learning environment.
D. CONTENT
Generally, speech may not be restricted based on its content.119
There are, however, “special characteristics of the school environment”
113

Id.
Seminski, supra note 76, at 182.
115
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (“We can, of course,
envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the school from
some remote locale.”).
116
Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625-41.
117
See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). But see Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty.
Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2011) (school-imposed discipline for webpage created to
ridicule another student, because it was likely that student’s online speech would reach school, given
that speech was targeted toward fellow students).
118
See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 626 (“Some [courts] will only engage in a Tinker analysis,
while others will also analyze under Fraser and examine the content of the speech to determine
whether it is lewd or vulgar.”).
119
E.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“As a general matter, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
114
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that allow school officials greater authority to control the content of the
student speech in order to provide a safe learning environment. 120
Fraser and Morse defined narrow exceptions to the general Tinker rule
that schools may not restrict student speech because of a simple desire to
avoid unpopular viewpoints. 121 School officials have the authority to
restrict the content of student speech if it is lewd or obscene, or if the
speech promotes illegal drug use. 122
The Internet, as an intangible medium, blurs the line between the
completely unrestricted right to free speech students enjoy outside of the
school environment and the right of schools to control the learning
environment within the schoolhouse gate. There is a great fear that
extending Fraser or Morse to online student speech will allow schools to
reach into students’ homes and restrict speech that would otherwise be
protected under the First Amendment. Accordingly, lower courts are
hesitant to rely exclusively on Fraser or Morse when analyzing online
student speech. 123
It is, however, the very content of online student speech that will
impact any potential effect the speech has within the school. If the
content of a student’s online speech does not possess a clear connection
to the school, it is unlikely to ever come to the attention of school
officials. When, however, the content of online student speech connects
the student’s expression to the school environment such that it could
materially or substantially disrupt the school or collide with the rights of
other students, the school will likely be able to serve its function to
prohibit certain speech in public discourse. 124
III. FUTURE COURTS SHOULD FOCUS ON THE EFFECT AND CONTENT OF
ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH
The location, effect, and content factors governing student speech
cases have been interpreted inconsistently as applied to online student
speech. The Hazelwood standard is directly applicable to online student
120

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393 (2007); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (“In order for the State in the person of school
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
122
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (holding that a student’s free speech rights were not violated based
on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school assembly); Morse, 551 U.S. at 403
(holding that school officials may “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”).
123
Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625.
124
See generally Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
121
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speech cases where the school could reasonably be seen to have
sponsored the speech. 125 The location of online student speech has
confused the application of Tinker, Fraser, and Morse because the
disputed speech in each case was communicated within the boundaries of
the schoolhouse gate, or during a school-sponsored event. 126 Online
student speech can intrude on the school environment via mobile phones,
personal laptops, computer tablets, or any Internet connection. 127 The
on-campus and off-campus distinction drawn by lower courts is
inapplicable to online speech cases, because it is irrelevant, given the
ability of the Internet to intrude upon the school environment.128 Instead,
the effect and content of online student speech should guide the analysis
of whether a school has the right to discipline a student for the student’s
online speech.
A. TINKER PROVIDES THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD TO ANALYZE
ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH
Though the Internet has created a new and advanced medium
through which students may communicate, 129 until the Supreme Court
provides further guidance, the principles set forth by Tinker outline the
proper guidelines under which to analyze online student speech. Tinker
should be applied to online speech, because it sets the standard under
which students may be punished for their speech while simultaneously
providing constitutional safeguards to protect students’ rights. 130 Tinker
is the Supreme Court decision on student speech rights that provides an
appropriately comprehensive, yet flexible, standard to embrace the
growing arena of technology.
Under Tinker, school authorities may not proscribe student speech
when the speech does not “materially and substantially interfer[e] with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,”

125

Klupinski, supra note 12, at 625-26 (explaining that “[a]t the outset, it must be noted that
the cases involving school-sponsored speech generally do not pose issues for schools” when applied
to Internet speech).
126
Id.; see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
127
Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 757 (“As a practical matter, the expression at issue in
Internet-related student speech cases almost always occurs ‘off-campus.’”).
128
Servance, supra note 2, at 1237 (“[O]ff-campus status becomes a somewhat false barrier to
school authority.”).
129
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
130
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (stating that students may freely express their opinions as long
as they do not materially and substantially interfere with school discipline or with the rights of
others).
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or when the speech does not “collid[e] with the rights of others.” 131 Both
prongs of Tinker are applicable and should be considered when analyzing
online student speech. 132
The first prong should be applied generally to grant schools the
power to discipline a student whose online speech has created a
substantial disruption within the school. 133 The idea that the student
expression is created outside of the school should not eclipse the reality
that online speech nevertheless has the ability to penetrate the school
environment and cause a material disruption. 134
The second prong of Tinker, the “invasion of the rights of others”
prong, has been established as a legitimate justification for the
proscription of certain student speech. 135 As applied to student speech
cases, this prong is triggered when the speech amounts to “harassment or
[has] some type of serious emotive impact.” 136 Just as it was important
for the Court to regulate speech that affects the overall ability of schools
to maintain “appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,” 137 it is
also important to protect every student’s right “to be secure and to be let
alone.” 138
In addition to offering a practical standard under which to analyze
student speech, Tinker also deters impulsive actions by school authorities
that may infringe upon students’ free speech rights by providing clear
guidelines for restriction of speech. 139 Allowing Tinker to govern online

131

See id. at 509 (holding that school officials may justify restriction on student expression
only by demonstrating that they had reason to anticipate that the conduct would “‘materially and
substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school’ [or] collid[e] with the rights of others”).
132
See generally Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 763-70.
133
Id. at 768-69 (“If the school does not claim that the student’s Internet expression was
threatening or constituted harassment, or if the school fails to justify its punishment under the ‘rights
of others’ prong, then the school must prove that the expression caused a ‘material and substantial
disruption’ in the school environment. Here, the punishment should be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny and courts should not relax the ‘substantial disruption’ prong, as some have in prior
Internet-related student speech cases.”).
134
To the extent that it is possible, disruption caused by school authorities’ investigation and
reaction to the speech should be separated from disruption caused solely by the speech, when
determining whether a material disruption occurred.
135
See West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[W]here school authorities reasonably believe that a student’s uncontrolled exercise of expression
might substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students, they may forbid such expression.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
136
Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 765.
137
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
138
Id. at 508.
139
See id. at 513 (explaining that students may freely express their opinions as long as they do
not materially and substantially interfere with school discipline or with the rights of others).
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student speech has led to fear that a school may have the ability to extend
its control within a student’s home to discipline students for “deviat[ing]
from the values that the school wishes to promote.” 140 Tinker, however,
works to further ensure protection of students’ free speech rights by
holding the school responsible for showing that its disciplinary action
“was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.” 141 This safeguard will be an important consideration, and
any motivation to deter certain speech should be inspected carefully. 142
The Supreme Court provided Tinker as an acceptable compromise
between the free speech rights of students and school authorities’ interest
in maintaining authority within the school. 143 School authorities should
be able to protect the school environment against online student speech,
just as they are authorized to restrict expression that occurs within the
“schoolhouse gate.” 144 If a student’s online speech substantially disrupts
the school or impinges upon the rights of another person at the school, 145
an unmistakable nexus between the speech and the school has been
formed. A complication of the boundless nature of the Internet emerges
when a student’s speech is disciplined before the speech has the
opportunity to affect the school.
B. REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY
The First Amendment does not require schools to wait for
disruption within the school in order to proscribe certain student
speech. 146 To the contrary, school officials have a duty to prevent such
disruption from occurring in the first place. 147 Tinker not only authorizes
restriction of student expression when there is an actual disruption felt
within the school, but also if there is reasonable forecast of such

140

Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 758.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
142
Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 768-69 (“Here, the punishment should be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny and courts should not relax the ‘substantial disruption’ prong, as some have in prior
Internet-related student speech cases.”).
143
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
144
Id. at 506.
145
Id. at 513.
146
See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Tinker does not require
school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn before closing the door. Nor does Tinker
‘require certainty that disruption will occur.’. . . Tinker does not require certainty, only that the
forecast of substantial disruption be reasonable.”).
147
See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he First Amendment does not
require school officials to wait until disruption actually occurs before they may act. In fact, they
have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances.” (footnote omitted)).
141
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disruption. 148 The possibilities for free speech violations against students
could be insurmountable if schools are not merely authorized, but rather
required, to discipline online student speech that has the mere potential to
reach the school and have an effect.
The Second Circuit, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education, affirmed
school officials’ authority to discipline a student for his online
expression, finding it reasonably foreseeable that the expression would
come to the attention of school officials. 149 Appropriately applying
Tinker, 150 the court found the risk of substantial disruption “not only
reasonable, but clear.” 151
The Wisniewski decision presents possible factors to be considered
when determining whether it is reasonably foreseeable that certain online
student speech may substantially disrupt the school. 152 In that case, a
student created a drawing of a gun firing a bullet at a person’s head,
including images of splattered blood, captioned “Kill Mr.
VanderMolen.” 153 The icon was displayed for three weeks and the
student sent instant messages with the icon to fifteen people, at least
some of which were his classmates. 154 The court determined that the
“extensive distribution of it, . . . during a three-week circulation period,
made [the risk of the speech coming to the attention of school
authorities] at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, if not
inevitable.” 155
Because of the boundless nature of the Internet, any online speech
has the potential to reach the school. The Wisniewski court did not
identify the distinguishing factor that will determine how the threat of
disruption caused by online speech will cross the threshold of

148

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (suggesting that the decision in the case might have been different
if there had been “evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the
armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of
other students”).
149
See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We are in agreement,
however, that . . . it was reasonably foreseeable that the [instant message] icon would come to the
attention of school authorities and the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot.”).
150
See id. at 40 (finding, after an analysis of the facts, that there could be “no doubt that the
icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials, would foreseeably create a risk of
substantial disruption within the school environment”).
151
Id.
152
See id. at 39-40 (listing four factors to justify the student’s punishment: the content of the
speech, the “extensive distribution” of the speech, the targeting of classmates as the audience for the
speech, and the circulation period of the speech).
152
Id. at 36.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 39-40.
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One standard that embraces the
“reasonable foreseeability.” 156
Wisniewski decision looks to the context in which a student
communicates online speech—if the student communicates online
speech within the scope of his or her position as a student, it is more
reasonably foreseeable that the speech will have an effect within the
school. 157
Speech occurs “within the scope of a student” if the speech would
not have occurred, but for the fact that the speaker was a student. 158 For
example: “[W]hen a student posts a message on his or her website that
contains derogatory references to his or her principal, the but-for inquiry
would be answered in the negative: But for the fact that the speaker was
a student at the principal’s school, the speech would not have
occurred.” 159 While this standard has been offered to reconcile the oncampus/off-campus distinction, 160 it has bearing on whether the student’s
speech will be subject to school authority based on the effect of that
speech. If the controversial online speech occurred “within the scope of
his or her status as a student,” 161 the odds increase that the speech has the
reasonable foreseeability to reach the school and ultimately have an
effect.
Online speech targeting an audience of other students will also
increase the likelihood of the online speech reaching the attention of
school officials. 162 Purposefully targeting members of the school by
accessing the speech at school, inviting other students to view the
speech, or informing other students of the speech and how to access it
will work to “facilitate[] the on-campus nature of the speech,” and bring
it under the umbrella of Tinker. 163
The effect of online student speech is at the center of analyzing
online student speech cases. Tinker’s standard is highly applicable and
156

See id. at 39 (“We are in agreement, however, that, on the undisputed facts, it was
reasonably foreseeable that the [instant message] icon would come to the attention of school
authorities and the teacher whom the icon depicted being shot.”).
157
See Reeves, supra note 3, at 1157-62 (arguing that online speech communicated within the
scope of a student’s status as such should be within school authority to restrict).
158
Id. at 1157.
159
Id. at 1157-58.
160
Id. at 1154 (applying the “scope of a student” standard to decipher whether the online
student speech should be considered on-campus or off-campus speech).
161
Id. at 1157.
162
See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that it
was likely a student’s online speech would reach the school, given that the speech was targeted
toward fellow students).
163
See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (“J.S., nevertheless,
facilitated the on-campus nature of the speech by accessing the web site on a school computer in a
classroom, showing the site to another student, and by informing other students at school of the
existence of the web site.”).
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should be used when a school has a “constitutionally valid reason to
regulate” such speech. 164 Reconciling the problem of whether it is
reasonably foreseeable that online student speech may cause an effect
within the school, courts should look to whether the speaker
communicated as a student. 165 As a contributing factor to the effect of a
student’s online speech, the very content of the student’s expression must
also be scrutinized.
C. THREE CATEGORIES SHOULD GUIDE COURTS IN ASSESSING THE
CONTENT OF ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH: OUTRAGEOUS OR
INHERENTLY DISRUPTIVE SPEECH, FOCUSED OR TARGETED
OFFENSIVE SPEECH, AND GENERAL SCHOOL-RELATED SPEECH
Certainly not every Internet communication made by a student in
his or her home will be subject to consequences imposed by school
authorities. Though the effect of student speech determines the ultimate
standard under which schools may proscribe student speech, it is the
content of the speech that presents schools with disciplinary authority.
Tinker originally announced the need to protect the content of student
speech under the First Amendment. 166 Fraser provided that the content
of students’ speech alone, when it is lewd or obscene, may provide an
immediate basis for schools to dispense appropriate punishment. 167
Likewise, Morse rendered student speech promoting illegal drug use
strictly unprotected within the school environment. 168
The Supreme Court has provided narrow categories governing the
First Amendment protections of student speech. 169 Lower courts,
however, should analyze the content of online student speech more
broadly to better apply Supreme Court precedent. This Comment offers
three categories that should serve as a guideline under which to analyze

164

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (“In the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are
entitled to freedom of expression of their views.”).
165
See Reeves, supra note 3, at 1157 (arguing that online speech communicated within the
scope of a student’s status as such should be within school authority to restrict).
166
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that students may freely express their opinions as
long as they do not materially and substantially interfere with school discipline or with the rights of
others).
167
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986) (holding that a student’s free
speech rights were not violated based on the content of a sexually suggestive speech during a school
assembly).
168
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (holding that school officials may “restrict
student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use”).
169
See discussion supra Part I.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/5

22

Willard: Decoding Student Speech Rights

2013]

Decoding Student Speech Rights

315

the content of the expression in online student speech cases: outrageous
or inherently disruptive speech, focused or targeted offensive speech,
general school-related speech.
1. Outrageous or Inherently Disruptive Speech
There are certainly some types of speech that need not be tolerated
in a school setting. 170 While the First Amendment provides citizens with
wide latitude to free speech, 171 some categories of speech have been
deemed simply unacceptable in public discourse. 172 Courts have defined
narrow categories of speech that the state may punish, including libel,
obscenity, and incitement. 173 Types of conduct that are unprotected in
general society are just as intolerable in the educational system. 174
Moreover, “the special characteristics of the school environment” further
restrict the behaviors considered acceptable in schools. 175 Speech that
falls outside of the constitutional expression of opinion will not even be
afforded the protection of Tinker. 176
The category of outrageous or inherently disruptive speech is meant
to classify speech that may invade upon the rights of others so greatly
that, by its very nature, it will “materially disrupt[] classwork or
involve[] substantial disorder.” 177 Just as some types of speech are so
inappropriate that they may warrant punishment when delivered in a
school auditorium, 178 students should be held accountable for outrageous
and inappropriate speech that invades the school but was expressed
through the Internet. When a student is the subject of a targeted attack
by another student, it will undoubtedly result in the loss of at least part of

170

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”).
171
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
172
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
173
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 254; Miller, 413 U.S. at 15; Brandenburg, 395 U.S.
at 444.
174
See Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public
School Jurisdiction over Students’ Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1604 (2009) (“[S]tatutes in
many states allow a school to suspend a student who is charged with a felony committed on or off
campus, and expel a student who is convicted of a felony if the school administrator determines that
‘the student’s continued presence in school would have a substantial detrimental effect on the
general welfare of the school.’” (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37H1/2 (1996))).
175
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
176
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007).
177
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (1969).
178
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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the targeted student’s opportunity to learn. 179 If this results, the school
has failed in its ability to maintain a safe learning environment. Two
examples of when a students’ online speech will be inherently within the
domain of school officials are true threats and “cyberbullying.”
a. True Treats
True threats are not a constitutionally protected expression of
speech, and are therefore never accepted in public discourse. 180 In light
of the events at Columbine High School in 1999 and similar subsequent
events, school administrators have become increasingly vigilant about
student speech that threatens the safety of students and teachers alike. 181
If a court determines a student’s online speech amounts to a true threat, it
will not be protected within the umbrella of Tinker. 182
b. Cyberbullying
“Cyberbullying” has been a topic controversial enough to warrant a
recent conference hosted at the White House by President Barack Obama
and First Lady Michelle Obama. 183 Though bullying is not a new
concept, the Internet makes it easier for bullies to prey on their victims.

179

See Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 767 (“If the student’s Internet expression constituted
‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ harassment and interfered with another student’s
‘opportunity to learn,’ then punishment will be justified under Tinker’s ‘rights of others’ prong.”
(footnote omitted)).
180
See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Threats of
physical violence are not protected by the First Amendment under either federal or state law, and as
a result, it does not matter to our analysis that Sarah Lovell uttered her comments while at school.
To resolve the federal claim, we need not rely upon the Supreme Court cases that limit students’ free
speech rights; because we hold that threats such as Lovell’s are not entitled to First Amendment
protection in any forum, it does not matter that the statement was made by a student in the school
context.”).
181
See Li, supra note 95, at 66 (“The primary issue addressed in Internet-related student
speech cases is whether the school violated the student’s First Amendment rights when it disciplined
the student for posting allegedly vulgar, violent, or lewd material on the Internet unrelated to any
school-sponsored activity or event. Many of these cases cited the Columbine tragedy to support the
proposition that schools must be given greater authority to effectively minimize violent student
behavior.” (footnotes omitted)).
182
See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 371 (“Threats of physical violence are not protected by the First
Amendment under either federal or state law, and as a result, it does not matter to our analysis that
Sarah Lovell uttered her comments while at school. To resolve the federal claim, we need not rely
upon the Supreme Court cases that limit students’ free speech rights; because we hold that threats
such as Lovell’s are not entitled o First Amendment protection in any forum, it does not matter that
the statement was made by a student in the school context.”).
183
The Office of the White House, President Obama & the First Lady: Conference on
Bullying Prevention (Mar. 10, 2011), available at www.whitehouse.gov/photos-andvideo/video/2011/03/10/president-obama-first-lady-conference-bullying-prevention/.
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“Cyberbullying” is defined as a “willful and repeated harm inflicted
through the use of computers, cell phones, and other electronic
devices.” 184 As of January 2013, forty-nine states require school policies
prohibiting cyberbullying and forty-three states allow schools to
implement sanctions against cyberbully students. 185 Because, according
to the Department of Education, legal action can be taken against schools
that do not address this harassment, schools must respond appropriately
to cyberbullying. 186
Though the legislature has made it clear that Internet harassment
should be a priority of school officials, the Supreme Court recently
denied certiorari on a case disputing the constitutionality of a school’s
disciplinary actions against a student for an online attack upon a fellow
student by creating an interactive discussion group on MySpace. 187 The
Fourth Circuit punished the student who invited approximately one
hundred people, including at least two dozen of her classmates, to join a
MySpace group entitled “S.A.S.H.”—an acronym for “Students Against
Shay’s [the targeted student’s] Herpes.” 188 The responses garnered from
the school’s students, in the form of comments and pictures, amounted to
no less than a hate campaign against the targeted student. 189 While the
most offensive speech did not come from the original speaker, she
created the forum and fueled the hateful speech with approving
comments. 190
This type of personal attack through the Internet will inescapably
collide with the victim’s right “to be secure and to be let alone,” 191 and
ultimately prevent the school from providing each student the
opportunity to learn. 192 For this reason, when online student speech
184

SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD:
PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO CYBERBULLYING 5 (2009).
185
SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, STATE CYBERBULLYING LAWS (Jan. 2013),
available at www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_Laws.pdf.
186
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: BULLYING AND HARASSMENT, WHITE
HOUSE CONFERENCE MATERIALS 2011, at 83, available at www.stopbullying.gov/resourcesfiles/white-house-conference-2011-materials.pdf.
187
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012).
188
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 567-68 (4th Cir. 2011).
189
Id. at 568-69 (“School administrators concluded that Kowalski had created a ‘hate
website,’ in violation of the school policy against ‘harassment, bullying, and intimidation.’”).
190
Id. at 568 (“Parsons uploaded a photograph of himself and a friend holding their noses
while displaying a sign that read, ‘Shay Has Herpes,’ referring to Shay N. The record of the
webpage shows that Kowalski promptly responded, stating, ‘Ray you are soo funny!=).’”).
191
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
192
See West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[W]here school authorities reasonably believe that a student’s uncontrolled exercise of expression
might substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students, they may forbid such expression.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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amounts to true threats or cyberbullying, courts should authorize
discipline without the protection of Tinker.
2. Focused or Targeted Offensive Speech
Lewd, vulgar, or otherwise patently offensive online student speech
causes a unique dilemma for schools. 193 While this type of speech has
plagued schools for decades and quite possibly centuries, the Internet
takes the speech from adolescents’ private conversations or passed notes
to an infinitely public platform. Distasteful, and sometimes downright
nasty, Internet remarks about teachers, other students, or school-related
activities have left many questions unresolved, resulting in inconsistent
case law. 194 While bullying is its own unique category, online offensive
speech directed toward the school continues to leave school authorities
searching for a strategy to protect its own officials and other students. 195
Fraser and Tinker would normally be the most applicable Supreme
Court precedents for analyzing offensive speech within schools. 196
While Fraser has historically been limited to on-campus speech, 197 the
principles supporting the ruling should still be applied to online speech.
The Fraser Court endorsed punishment of the student’s lewd speech,
because the Court deemed it a “highly appropriate function of public
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in
public discourse.” 198 It further explained that schools were not limited
by the Constitution from “insisting that certain modes of expression are
inappropriate and subject to sanctions.” 199 The speech in question was
sexually explicit in nature, but the Court expanded its ruling to include

193

See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 626 (“Further complicating matters, these courts also
differ on which standards to apply if the speech is considered student speech. Some will only
engage in a Tinker analysis, while others will also analyze under Fraser and examine the content of
the speech to determine whether it is lewd or vulgar.”).
194
See Jacob Tabor, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off-Campus
Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 591 (2009) (“The question of school
regulation of off-campus cyberspeech is a challenging one that the Supreme Court has not directly
resolved.”).
195
See Klupinski, supra note 12, at 626 (“Further complicating matters, these courts also
differ on which standards to apply if the speech is considered student speech. Some will only
engage in a Tinker analysis, while others will also analyze under Fraser and examine the content of
the speech to determine whether it is lewd or vulgar.”).
196
See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). The lewd and
vulgar content of Fraser’s speech was the focus of the justification for punishment. Id. at 685–86.
197
See generally id. The Court included the location of the speech—in front of a young,
captive audience—as a justification for the student’s punishment. Id. at 684–86.
198
Id. at 684.
199
Id.
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vulgar and lewd speech that may “undermine the school’s basic
educational mission.” 200
Fraser alone could not adequately justify authorizing school
authorities to punish all students for their lewd, vulgar, or offensive
online speech. 201 The underlying principles of Tinker and Fraser should
be used to analyze offensive online speech that is targeted at the school.
While schools have the ability to “prohibit the use of vulgar and
offensive terms in public discourse,” 202 schools must be held accountable
by showing a disruption to the school or invasion upon the rights of
another student and justify restrictions on a particular expression of
opinion. 203
a. Parody Profiles
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari on two exceptionally
similar cases involving two unrelated Pennsylvania students’ creation of
parody MySpace profiles of their respective school principals. 204 Both
students created the profiles in their homes, used school resources only to
obtain a picture of the principal, and incorporated offensive, if not cruel,
language in the parody profiles. 205 The Third Circuit, sitting en banc,
struggled with analysis of all previous student speech Supreme Court
cases only to ultimately decide Tinker is the applicable rule, because of
the off-campus nature of the speech. 206
Under Tinker, these cases are only subject to the material and
substantial disruption analysis, because the Tinker Court specified that
the rights of other students—not school officials—be protected from
invasion. 207 Fraser, however, may provide respite for teachers from
offensive attacks while the requirement that schools show more than

200

Id. at 685.
See Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 527 F.3d 41 (2d
Cir. 2008). The court reasoned that applying Fraser alone would allow a school to censor speech it
deemed vulgar, offensive, or otherwise contrary to the school’s mission, without having to show
substantial disruption. Id.
202
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
203
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
204
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S., 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (cases below, 650 F.3d 915 (3d
Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
205
See generally J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc);
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
206
See generally J.S., 650 F.3d 915; Layshock, 650 F.3d 205.
207
Schiffhauer, supra note 11, at 765 (“If the student’s Internet expression constituted
‘severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive’ harassment and interfered with another student’s
‘opportunity to learn,’ then punishment will be justified under Tinker’s ‘rights of other’s’ prong.”
(footnote omitted)).
201
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“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance” 208 will place
significant safeguards to prevent against knee-jerk reactions by school
officials to protect against healthy disapproval.
b. Indecent Photographs
The use of social networking websites 209 centered on sharing
personal pictures has created an entire sub-section of student conduct that
school officials attempt to address through school discipline. 210 Though
the pictures may not target the school specifically, school officials have
exerted their authority and disciplined students nevertheless. 211 Future
courts should apply Tinker and Fraser principles to online student speech
cases involving possibly indecent photographs.
Judge Philip P. Simon said it best when he declared, “Not much
good takes place at slumber parties for high school kids, and this case
proves the point.” 212 Two high school students, fifteen and sixteen years
old, were suspended for posing for and posting “raunchy” pictures of
themselves on their MySpace, Facebook and Photo Bucket accounts. 213
The pictures displayed the girls fully clothed or in lingerie in suggestive
positions and were taken at a series of slumber parties during the middle
of the summer. 214 Captions describing the pictures were lewd, making
reference to the male anatomy in less than decent terms. 215 Though the
pictures were taken in the summer within a student’s home, printouts of
the pictures were brought to the school by parents who were concerned
about the effects of the pictures. 216 Both students were disciplined
because the principal found that the pictures had a “potential for causing
disruption of student activities.” 217
Though the pictures were indecent, 218 they were found to be an
attempt at a “particularized message of crude humor likely to be
understood by those they expected to view the conduct” 219 rather than

208

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
See, e.g., Tumblr.com; instagr.am/.
210
See, e.g., T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
211
See, e.g., id.
212
Id. at 771.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 772.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 772-73.
218
The district court found the pictures not to be obscene according to the legal definition,
and therefore not inherently offensive. Id. at 778.
219
T.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
209
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“deviate sexual conduct.” 220 The court assumed, without definitively
deciding, that was the default rule applicable to this case after an initial
attempt to incorporate Fraser was defeated by a classification of “offcampus” speech. 221 Ultimately, the court found nothing in the record
that would “come close to meeting” the Tinker standard, and held that
school officials did violate the students’ constitutional rights. 222
A school’s interest in “prohibit[ing] the use of vulgar and offensive
[speech] in public discourse” 223 should be considered in offensive online
student speech cases. Even if there is an overwhelming interest for the
school to restrict lewd and obscene speech within the public discourse, as
described in Fraser, the Tinker standard would still work to prevent the
school from punishing students for indecent pictures if they do not
“material[ly] disrupt[] classwork or involve[] substantial disorder or
inva[de] . . . the rights of others.” 224
3. General School-Related Speech
Allowing schools to reach into students’ homes and wield control
over any language created within the scope of the speaker’s status as a
student would be unconstitutional. 225 General school-related speech
does not trigger the second prong of Tinker—a collision with the rights
of other students—because it does not include speech directed at any
specific student. Online student speech that generally relates to the
school will be subject to Tinker’s “material and substantial disruption”
prong, 226 and will be punishable accordingly.
It is an established concept that even when online speech is
expressed outside of the school, it may nevertheless have an effect within
the school. 227 In the Second Circuit, a student council member posted a
lewd, inaccurate blog post regarding a school-sponsored social event. 228

220

Id. at 778.
Id. at 779.
222
Id. at 779-85.
223
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
224
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
225
Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet
Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 161 (2003) (“Schools that punish students for wearing Marilyn
Manson t-shirts or waving confederate flags at school do not attempt to discipline students for doing
so off-campus, yet off-campus criticism of school authority is far more likely to result in academic
punishment.”).
226
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
227
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979) (“We can, of course,
envision a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the school from
some remote locale.”).
228
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2008).
221
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School officials postponed the event multiple times when a final
postponement due to technical arrangements upset the Senior Class
Secretary enough to send a mass email to school members and post to
her personal blog about the issue. 229 Though the event was merely
postponed, the contentious blog entry claimed it was cancelled due to the
“douchebags in central office.” 230 In both the email and blog entry, the
student calls for outraged students to contact school officials—
specifically her superintendent—who she claimed got “pissed off” and
decided to call off the event. 231
Mildly vulgar by today’s standards, the blog entry would likely not
trigger the Fraser interest of the school. 232 Instead, it is the directed call
of action encouraging phone calls and emails to school officials that
caused a disruption. 233 In response to the students’ online speech, both
the principal and superintendent received such an influx of both phone
calls and emails regarding the event that they arrived late to, or were
forced to miss, several school-related activities for at least two
consecutive days. 234
While acknowledging the “vulgar” nature of the speech, the court
found that the “potentially incendiary language” 235 did cause a
“foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and discipline of
the school.” 236 The school did not violate the student’s rights based on
three distinct justifications: first, because the language was both plainly
offensive and potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing
controversy; second, because the effort to solicit more calls and emails
made it foreseeable that school operations may be disrupted; and finally,
because the student’s role as a school government leader risked both
disruption and frustration of the proper operation of the school’s
government. 237
The court’s rationale appropriately incorporated the consideration of
both the effect of the speech and the content of the speech. The second
and third justifications properly place emphasis on the effect of the
speech—the foreseeability of the speech having an effect, and her role as

229

Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
231
Id.
232
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
233
Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
234
Id. at 46 (citing case below, Doninger v. Niehoff, 514 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D. Conn.
2007)).
235
Id. at 51.
236
Id. at 53.
237
See id. at 50-52.
230

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/5

30

Willard: Decoding Student Speech Rights

2013]

Decoding Student Speech Rights

323

a student increasing the likelihood of such an effect. 238 The first
justification correctly places focus on the “potentially disruptive” content
of the speech. 239 Tinker’s first prong requires that “material or
substantial disruption to the work and discipline of the school” should
govern generally school-related online speech. 240 Though online student
speech that generally relates to the school will not come under the
authority of school officials, the opposite is true for online speech that
directly triggers Tinker.
CONCLUSION
While creating a boundless forum for expressive speech, the
Internet has caused disorder in the balance between students’ free speech
rights and school authorities’ interest in maintaining a disciplined school
environment. The lack of guidance from the Supreme Court has created
chaos in the lower courts’ adjudication of online student speech cases.
Consistent with current Supreme Court precedent, courts ultimately
look to four factors when analyzing student speech cases: sponsorship,
location, effect, and content. 241 Sponsorship is drawn from the
Hazelwood standard, which allows school officials to restrict student
speech that could be seen as school-sponsored. 242 This standard is
directly applicable to online student speech cases. As applied to online
student speech, the location of the speech is inconsequential given the
boundless nature of the Internet and its ability to intrude upon the school
environment. Ultimately, the effect and the content of online student
speech are the most applicable factors to assess when determining
student’s free speech rights.
The effect and content of online student speech should be analyzed
to determine student’s free speech rights in the Internet age. As the
principal Supreme Court precedent, the two-prong effects test of Tinker
should be applied to online speech cases because it both designates the
appropriate standard and allocates the necessary safeguards to students’
constitutional rights. The content of the online student speech should not
be ignored, but rather examined according to three distinct
classifications: inherently disruptive speech, focused or targeted speech,
or general school-related speech.

238

Id. at 52.
Id. at 51-52.
240
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
241
Klupinski, supra note 12, at 643.
242
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
239
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Inherently disruptive speech will directly trigger the Tinker
standard, and should be punishable if the speech creates a material
disruption within the school. Online student speech that is focused or
targeted at the school should be analyzed under both Tinker and Fraser
standards, because they provide the appropriate balance between
students’ First Amendment rights and the school’s duty to provide a safe
learning environment. Finally, general school-related speech should be
outside the authority of school officials, unless it creates a substantial or
material disruption within the school.
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